This chapter introduces readers to the key debates about the relationship between rights and democracy that are explored throughout the work as a whole as well as to the philosophical framework that is developed to defend rights as a valuable language of democratic politics. Identifying several philosophical and political problems that have rendered rights a suspect language of democratic contestation, it makes the case for re-examining the relationship between rights and democracy rather than either too quickly dismissing or too heartily defending rights as consistent with democracy. The chapter draws on insights from speech act theory and democratic theory to develops a performative perspective on rights claiming and suggests that the democratic character of rights, their potential and their limits, becomes more visible when we understand rights as a performative utterances that shape as well as reflect our identity, our communities, and our understanding of politics. This chapter thus sets out the meaning of key terms, such as rights, rights claiming, and performativity, and establishes the importance of appreciating what speech act theorists call the perlocutionary rather than simply the illocutionary dimensions of speech acts. "Liberal democracy" is the name given to a regime that much of the world lives in or aspires to, and both liberal and deliberative theorists focus much of their intellectual energy on working to reshape and perfect this regime. But what if "liberal democracy" were a contradiction in terms? Taking up Jacques Rancière's polemical claim that democracy is not a regime, Samuel Chambers argues that liberalism and democracy are not complements, but competing forces. By way of the most in-depth and rigorous treatment of Rancière's writings to date, this book seeks to disentangle democracy from liberalism. Liberalism is a logic of order and hierarchy, of the proper distribution of responsibilities and rights, whereas democratic politics follows a logic of disordering that challenges and disrupts any claims that the allocation of roles could be complete. This book resists the tendency to collapse democracy into the broader terms of liberalism, by defending a vision of "impure" politics. chambers shows that there is no sphere proper to politics, no protected political domain. The job of political theory is therefore not to say what is required in order for politics to occur, not to develop ideal "normative" models of politics, and not even to create new political ontologies. Instead, political theory is itself an enactment of politics in Rancière's sense of dissensus: politics thwarts any social order of domination. The book explores the possibility of a critical theory beyond unmasking and a democratic politics beyond liberalism. This concluding chapter assesses the ways in which this study's pragmatist account might answer the practical question about the acceptance of democratic politics. Unlike most normative arguments, this study's pragmatist account directly incorporates the inevitability of disagreement and conflict. In doing so, it provides an argument for the central role of ongoing political debate in establishing and maintaining the bases of legitimacy and obligation. And, through an analysis of the effects of democratic decision making on the collective outcomes that it produces, the study makes a case for the superiority of a democratic institutional framework as the forum for undertaking such debates. It argues that when there is persistent conflict and disagreement, making collective decisions democratically is the best means of creating an institutional environmental in which both individual and collective life plans can be effectively pursued. This chapter explores the relationship between politics and scandal throughout American history. Scandals had been part of American politics since the revolution, but they had never so pervasive as in the last three decades of the twentieth century. They had become integral to partisan strategy, political reform, and the public perception of government. The chapter first considers the role of scandal in national politics in the early postwar era, 1945-1964, before discussing the efforts of public interest groups in collaboration with liberal Democrats to put corruption on the national agenda. It then examines the politics of reform between 1972 and 1978, along with the change in political style that gradually encouraged the latent tendency of democratic politics to veer into scandal during the period 1978-1992. It also looks at television coverage of scandals and the impeachment of Bill Clinton and concludes with some reflections on the future of scandal politics. This chapter sets out the argument of the book: first showing that the conflation of liberalism and democratic politics serves to enervate the latter, and then going on to make the case for disentangling democratic politics from the structures of liberalism. The chapter is guided by Rancière's radical pedagogical principle of the equality of intelligence: the idea that students can understand a book on their own, and that the traditional model of explanation is nothing less than stultification. Using the Egyptian revolution as an illustrative example of liberalism's inability to account for a "politics of surprise," the chapter then works through some of Rancière's central concepts: subject, ontology, history, and equality. This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena. This chapter raises the broader question of the relation between incentives and democratic politics. The use of incentives as a tool of government policy appears to increase our choices and protect a space of freedom. This seems to be better than government regulations that foreclose options and establish penalties for transgressions. However, to the extent that incentives are one of the ways in which experts seek to manipulate behavior, and to the extent that incentive systems substitute for persuasion and foreclose deliberation and debate, a democratic people ought to be deeply suspicious of them. At the very least, the question of the ethics of incentives leads directly to the question of the role of experts in a democracy and finally, further still, to the question of what kind of citizens we aspire to be. Individual decision making can often be wrong due to misinformation, impulses, or biases. Collective decision making, on the other hand, can be surprisingly accurate. This book demonstrates that the very factors behind the superiority of collective decision making add up to a strong case for democracy. The book shows that the processes and procedures of democratic decision making form a cognitive system that ensures that decisions taken by the many are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few. Democracy as a form of government is therefore valuable not only because it is legitimate and just, but also because it is smart. The book considers how the argument plays out with respect to two main mechanisms of democratic politics: inclusive deliberation and majority rule. In deliberative settings, the truth-tracking properties of deliberation are enhanced more by inclusiveness than by individual competence. The book explores this idea in the contexts of representative democracy and the selection of representatives. It also discusses several models for the "wisdom of crowds" channeled by majority rule, examining the trade-offs between inclusiveness and individual competence in voting. When inclusive deliberation and majority rule are combined, they beat less inclusive methods, in which one person or a small group decides. The book thus establishes the superiority of democracy as a way of making decisions for the common good. Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. This book systematically explores the subject and makes a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics-and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? This book explores how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. It concludes that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be madeeven if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. This book argues that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, the book suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the political theorist Hannah Arendt argued that the plight of stateless people in the inter-war period pointed to the existence of a 'right to have rights'. This right to have rights was the right to citizenship-to membership of a political community. Since then, and especially in recent years, theorists have continued to grapple with the meaning of the right to have rights. In the context of enduring statelessness, mass migration, people flows, and the contested nature of democratic politics, the question of the right to have rights remains of pressing concern for writers and advocates across the disciplines. This book provides the first in-depth examination of the right to have rights in the context of the international protection of human rights. It explores two overarching questions. First, how do different and competing conceptions of the right to have rights shed light on right-bearing in the contemporary context, and in particular on concepts and relationships central to the protection of human rights in public international law? Secondly, given these competing conceptions, how is the right to have rights to be understood in the context of public international law? In the course of the analysis, the author examines the significance and limits of citizenship, nationality, humanity, and politics for right-bearing, and argues that their complex interrelation points to how the right to have rights might be rearticulated for the purposes of international legal thought and practice. This chapter provides a basis for a pragmatist account of democracy. It specifies three features-fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism-as central to pragmatism understood as a philosophical position. The chapter also makes two further claims that are distinctive. First, pragmatism has important political consequences and that those sustain a commitment to robust democratic politics. Second, insofar as pragmatists are committed to democratic politics, they necessarily are committed not just to an ethos or ideal but to the analysis of democratic institutions. Each of these arguments will come as a surprise not just to those who come to pragmatism from the outside but to many who consider themselves pragmatists. This chapter focuses on how to think more productively about the democratic experiment and political competence. It begins by summarizing this study's theory and findings. It then looks at the implications of both theory and findings for a supply-side theory of political competence. Finally, it presents a nice irony of democratic politics. It is well-known that limited knowledge of voters frees up elected representatives to act as they wish with minimal fear of electoral punishment. It is less well-known, though no less important, that understanding as well as ignorance of the big picture of American politics allows elected representatives a freer hand in playing the policy cards they wish to play and still win the backing of supporters of their party. This chapter turns toward the political situation, asking what contribution this new idea of political equality can make in thinking about and acting in the state of the current world. The theory of democratic politics turns its back on those who benefit from the inequalities of the police order. Distributive theories of justice can provide people nothing more than the obligations of others. Passivity, even when it is passive equality, is a thin reed upon which to balance the prospect of hope. Humanitarian assistance is profoundly apolitical. It is a countermovement to democratic politics. Democratic politics is a recipe for disinvestment. Rancière's thought provides a sketch of a politics that responds to the passivity of the current politics. Thought alone does not organize politics, but politics without thought is as dangerous an endeavor as can be imagined.
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The End of the Estado Nôvo and the Dutra Years Thomas E. Skidmore in Politics in Brazil, 1930 Brazil, -1964 This chapter develops a normative framework for democratic politics. The concept of domination plays a central role in the intersection of democratic politics with anarchism. A democratic politics exists when people act out of the presupposition of equality. Democratic politics holds movements that presuppose equality to be a good thing. It does not arise without changing the ethical space in which it arises. Violence is the natural temptation for those raised in a police order. Nonviolent political action is the most direct expression of a democratic politics that tries to express equality without denying the equality of others. The deeper the history of denial of equality, the stronger that temptation is. In this sense, the normative framework of democratic politics provides a corrective.
Leadership by the Famous: Celebrity as Political Capital Many of us care about refugees and displaced children. Tens of thousands of us spend considerable amounts of time and money improving their situation. But few of us have been as effective in drawing attention to these issues and keeping them on the agenda of political elites and institutions around the world as celebrities such as Angelina Jolie have been. Star power defies conventional accounts of democratic leadership. It epitomizes the notion of leadership dispersal, although not one that is the product of institutional design let alone constitutional foresight. It rests upon personal rather than institutional moral capital, that capital is derived from fame, dramaturgy, and personality marketing in the non-political sphere, rather than by democratic election, representation, and accountability.
